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I. INTRODUCTION 
Take out a pencil and a piece of paper. Now write down the 
number five and put fourteen zeros after it. Now, going from right to 
left, place a comma after every three zeros. Finally, put a dollar sign in 
front of the number. Now, look at the number. 
$500,000,000,000,000. 
Five Hundred Trillion Dollars. To the majority of the public, that 
amount of money is the equivalent of "a million bajillion" dollars. It is 
more than thirty-three times the 2011 Gross Domestic Product of the 
United States 1 and, if stacked in $100 dollar bills, would be taller than 
( and consume) the Empire State Building. 2 However, five hundred 
trillion dollars is the amount of money that was left in the hands of 
greedy investment bankers looking to make a quick buck. How? Since 
its institution, the London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") has been 
left unregulated. As a result, a few greedy individuals manipulated the 
rate for their own financial advantage at the expense of every individual 
who has ever taken out a loan. And how much money does LIBOR 
affect? Five Hundred Trillion Dollars. 
LIBOR is a benchmark interest rate that reflects the cost of 
borrowing for banks and has been used to set an estimated $500 trillion 
worth of financial instruments. 3 A number of banks have been accused 
1. See GDP (current US$), THE WORLD BANK, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
2. See generally US Debt Ceiling Visualized in $100 Bills, DEMONOCRACY INFO, 
available at http://demonocracy.info/infographics/usa/us _debt/us_ debt.html (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2013). 
3. See Heidi N. Moore, LIBOR for Mortals: An Easy Explainer, MARKETPLACE (July 
3, 2012, 3:40 PM), available at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/easy-street/libor-
mortals-easy-explainer (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
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of attempting to manipulate LIBOR from 2005 through 2009. 4 The 
manipulation stemmed from two sources: ( 1) derivative traders, 
colluding with counterparts at other banks in attempting to manipulate 
LIBOR submissions to boost individual trading profits; and (2) 
executive level focused 'decisions' or collaborations to falsely lower 
LIBOR submissions in order to give an artificial impression of sounder 
financial strength. 5 
Out of the potential twenty banks believed to be involved, to date, 
only UBS and Barclays have admitted rate manipulation and false 
reporting.6 Subsequently, Barclays negotiated a $450 million settlement 
which was divided amongst the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Financial Services 
Authority. 7 To date, the U.K. and the U.S. criminal investigations have 
been led by the Serious Fraud Office and the Department of Justice, 
respectively. 8 
While much of the focus thus far has been on the actions taken by 
governments and regulators, this Note will focus on the institution and 
history ofLIBOR, the manipulation ofLIBOR from 2005 through 2009, 
and the evidence supporting collusion between banks to manipulate 
LIBOR. Furthermore, this Note will examine a regulation proposal and 
recommendations to the LIBOR system by Martin Wheatley, a top U.K. 
regulator, and how his proposal fails to address the culture of the 
banking system. Finally, this Note will propose the creation of a 
"whistle blowing" incentive system to be instituted along with a 
4. See James O'Toole, Explaining the Libor Interest Rate Mess, CNNMONEY (July 10, 
2012, 12:07 PM), available at http://money.cnn.com/2012/07 /03/investing/libor-interest-
rate-faq/index.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
5. See Halah Touryalai, Regulators Instructed Barclays to Lower Libor: Del Missier 
Testifies, FORBES (July 16, 2012, 1 :42 PM), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/07 I 16/regulators-instructed-barclays-to-
lower-libor-del-missier-testifies/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); see also James O'Toole, 
Winners and Losers in Libor Mess, CNNMONEY (July 12, 2012, 5:10 AM), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07 /12/investing/libor-consumers/index.htm (last visited Sept. 
20, 2013). 
6. See UBS Fined $1.5B over Libor Manipulation, FoxBUSINESS (Dec. 19, 2012), 
available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/ l 2/l 9/ubs-fined- l 5b-over-libor-
manipulation/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
7. See Barclays Will Pay $450Mfor Manipulation Interest Rates, USA TODAY (July 
27, 2012) available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/story/2012-06-27 /barclays-
penalty/55854212/1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
8. See id.; see also Jill Treanor, Serious Fraud Office to Investigate Libor 
Manipulation, GUARDIAN (London) (July 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.guardian.co. uk/business/20 l 2/jul/06/serious-fraud-office-libor-investigation 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013 ). 
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regulatory overhaul of the LIBOR system. 
Part II of this Note will provide background information on 
LIBOR, specifically how LIBOR is calculated and how it affects any 
person who takes out a loan. Part III of this Note will present an 
overview of the LIBOR manipulation through investigation into 
Barclays Bank, specifically through violations found by regulatory 
authorities and the settlement between Barclays and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Part IV of this Note will 
display evidence suggesting that LIBOR submitting banks colluded to 
manipulate LIBOR during the 2007 and 2008 financial crisis. Part V of 
this Note will discuss Martin Wheatley's proposed reforms to the 
LIBOR system and the reaction it received from the public. Part VI of 
this Note will discuss the problems within Wheatley's regulation 
scheme, specifically its failure to account for the banking culture among 
LIBOR submitting banks. Finally, Part VII of this Note will 
recommend reform for LIBOR and the institution of "whistle blowing" 
incentives for LIBOR submitting banks. 
II. LIBOR 
This section provides background information on LIBOR. Part A 
defines LIBOR and how it is calculated, while Part B discusses what 
information is taken from LIBOR and how it affects any common 
person that takes out a loan. 
A. What is LJBOR? 
LIBOR is an interest rate set in London through submissions of 
lending rates by eighteen major banks. 9 The submission by each bank is 
a calculation of how much interest each bank would have to pay to 
borrow from one of the other banks. 10 The British Bankers' Association 
("BBA"), with assistance from the Foreign Exchange and Money 
Markets Committee, selects the specific banks that will submit rates for 
the calculation of LIBOR based on the bank's market volume, 
9. Moore, supra note 3. The complete list of all 18 banks that contributed to fixing 
LIBOR are as follows: (I) Bank of America, (2) Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd, (3) 
Barclays Bank PLC, (4) BNP Paribas, (5) Citibank NA, (6) Credit Agricole CIB, (7) Credit 
Suisse, (8) Deutsche Bank AG, (9) HSBC, (10) JP Morgan Chase, (11) Lloyds Banking 
Group, (12) Rabobank, (13) Royal Bank of Canada, (14) Societe Generale, (15) Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking Corporation, ( 16) The Norinchukin Bank, ( 17) The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group, and (18) UBS AG. US Dollar Panel, BBALIBOR (May 2012), available at 
http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/usd (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
10. Moore, supra note 3. 
4
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/6
2013] The LIBOR Manipulation Scandal 203 
reputation, and assumed knowledge of the currency concerned. 11 The 
selection of banks occur each year, but rarely result in any change. 12 
Many well-known banks such as Bank of America, Barclays, JPMorgan 
Chase, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC are among the banks selected by the 
BBA. 13 
The use of LIBOR can be traced back to the late 1960's, when the 
rate that banks used to borrow money was set and governed by a "small 
group of like-minded bankers" based in London. 14 Minos A. 
Zombanakis, a former banker at Manufacturers Hanover, recalls the first 
LIB OR loan, an $80 million loan extended by a group of banks to Iran. 
He explained, "we had to fix a rate, so I called up all the banks and 
asked them to send to me by 11 a.m. their cost of money. We got the 
rates, I made an average of them all and I named it the London 
interbank offered rate." 1 For the next fifteen years, the banks set the 
rate at which banks could lend to each other roughly as Zombanakis 
described. 16 Although this may be shocking in today's financial world, 
there was a trust amongst bankers that they would truthfully submit 
their rates without looking out for their own interests. 17 
In 1986, the banks asked the BBA to bring a measure of uniformity 
into the market and to devise a benchmark to act as a reference for new 
financial instruments, such as Forward Rate Agreements, that were 
actively trading in the market. 18 Rather than negotiating the underlying 
rate or forming rates by taking averages of ad-hoc panels, banks could 
now use a standard rate. 19 This facilitated the operation of markets and 
made benchmarking more transparent and objective.20 
11. LIBOR, Information About the London InterBank Offered Rate, GLOBAL-RATES, 
available at http://www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/libor-information.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter LIBOR, global-rates]. 
12. Id. 
13. Moore, supra note 3. 
14. Id.; Landon Thomas, Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2012), available at http://nytimes.com/2012/07/06/business/global/the-
gentlemens-club-that-sets-libor-is-called-into-question.html?pagewatned=all&_r=O (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
15. Thomas, Jr., supra note 14. 
16. Moore, supra note 3; Thomas, Jr., supra note 14. 
17. Moore, supra note 3. 
18. Historical Libor Rates, BBALIBOR, available at 
http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/historical-perspective (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) 
[hereinafter BBALIBOR]; Timeline: How the Libor scandal unfolded, TELEGRAPH (London) 
(Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/libor-
scandal/9754981/Timeline-How-the-Libor-scandal-unfolded.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
19. BBALIBOR, supra note 18. 
20. Id. 
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At first, LIBOR was a benchmark for only a few currencies, which 
included the American dollar, the British pound sterling, and the 
Japanese yen.21 Over the years, LIBOR expanded to include sixteen 
currencies, but is presently a benchmark for only ten currencies.22 To 
date, regulators estimate that LIBOR supports more than $500 trillion 
worth of financial instruments, ranging from simple mortgages to risky 
derivative transactions, worldwide. 23 
Currently, LIBOR is calculated in a similar way that Zombanakis 
described. Each bank that is selected by the BBA answers the specific 
question "at what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by 
asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market 
size just prior to 11 a.m. ?"24 The bank then looks at its own financials, 
looks at how much interest it would have to pay to borrow from another 
bank, and submits a rate. 25 The BBA compiles all of the submissions 
from the banks and presents the information to Thomson Reuters, a 
global provider of business information. 26 Once Thomson Reuters 
collects all of the rates from the panel banks, the highest and lowest 
twenty-five percent of the submissions are eliminated. 27 Then, 
Thompson Reuters takes an average of the remaining rates to produce 
the official LIBOR rate.28 As this process suggests, LIBOR must rely 
on accurate and truthful submissions from each of the banks or LIBOR 
will be skewed in one direction and the system will fail. 
So why does it matter ifLIBOR is skewed in one direction? Well, 
LIBOR is the primary way to measure the health of the banking system 
worldwide.29 Many banks will rely on this rate to determine the risk 
involved with lending and "whether the other banks they do business 
21. LIBOR, global-rates, supra note 11. 
22. Id. The ten currencies are as follows: (1) American dollar, (2) Australian dollar, (3) 
British pound sterling, (4) Canadian dollar, (5) Danish krone, (6) European euro, (7) 
Japanese yen, (8) New Zealand dollar, (9) Swedish krona, and (10) Swiss franc. Id. 
23. See Yuval Rosenberg, Libor-gate Explained: Why Barclays' Scandal Matters, 
FISCAL TIMES (July 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.thefiscatimes.com/ Articles/2012/07 /06/Libor-gate-Explained-Why-Barclays-
Scandel-Matters.aspx#page 1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
24. BBALIBOR, supra note 18; see also Rosenberg, supra note 23 . 
25. Moore, supra note 3; see also Rosenberg, supra note 23. 
26. Moore, supra note 3. 
27. Id.; see also Matthew Jensen, The Uses of LIBOR and the Victims of its 
Manipulation: A Primer, AMERICAN (Aug. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.american.com/archive/2012/august/the-uses-of-libor-and-the-victims-of-its-
manipulation-a-primer (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
28. Moore, supra note 3. 
29. Id. 
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with are good for the money."30 In simple terms, if LIBOR is high, it 
means that banks do not believe the other banks are in good financial 
health and are less likely to pay back loans that they will receive. 31 If 
LIBOR is low, it makes the banking system look healthy and 
creditworthy. 32 However, this correlation between LIBOR and financial 
health may incentivize banks to submit lower rates. If a bank continues 
to submit higher rates than its peers, which will be publicly available, it 
may tip off the market that the bank is more risky or desperate for cash. 
Once the market or investors obtain this information, they may invest 
with other banks and cause banks submitting higher rates to lose 
business. Therefore, if the majority of panel banks consistently 
submitted low LIBOR rates, the remaining banks may underestimate 
their true lending rate to refrain from reporting higher rates. 
B. Who is Affected by LIBOR? 
To many people, LIBOR may seem like financial jargon thrown 
around by bankers at a cocktail party. However, LIBOR affects 
virtually every common person who obtains a loan. 33 In the U.S., banks 
have used LIBOR to set the borrowing rate for student loans, 
adjustable-rate mortgages, and car loans.34 In the U.K., many of the 
same products rely on LIB OR. 35 
For example, if a person has an adjustable-rate mortgage, it will 
usually be tied to LIB OR. 36 With an adjustable-rate mortgage, a 
borrower will lock in an interest rate, typically a low one, for a fixed 
period. 37 Once that period ends, usually in three, five, or twelve 
months, the mortgage rate resets to the current interest rate of the 
index.38 If LIBOR is lower when the mortgage rate resets, a borrower's 




33. Moore, supra note 3; see also Jensen, supra note 27. 
34. Moore, supra note 3; see also Jensen, supra note 27. 
35. See BBALIBOR, supra note 18. 
36. Donna Fuscaldo, Libor: What It Means/or US Consumer Loans, BANKRATE (Aug. 
3, 2013), available at http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/libor-what-it-means-for-us-
consumer-loans.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Kirsten Grind, What Libor Means 
for You, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2012), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000087239639044354550457756512072803 7852.html 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
37. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36. 
38. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36. 
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borrower's premium will rise. 39 
The process is very similar for a person with student loans tied to 
LIBOR. It is common for students to take out loans with a rate that is 
LIBOR plus 2% or LIBOR plus 7%.40 If a student signs a loan when 
LIBOR is high, the loan repayment will be more expensive than if 
LIBOR is low. In both cases, the loan rate rests on the foundation that 
banks will submit honest and accurate LIBOR rates and will not 
consider their own interests when making submissions. 
Although inaccurate or dishonest submissions will affect LIBOR, 
the change of LIB OR impacts an individual's finances differently. If an 
individual has the financial security to handle increases in mortgage or 
student loan premiums, an inyrease in LIBO R may not have a 
substantial effect on the individual. However, for people who are 
simply making mortgage or student loan payments and do not have the 
financial wherewithal to deal with an increase in LIBOR, the effects 
could be devastating. Therefore, a bank that is manipulating LIBOR, 
either higher or lower, to stay aligned with the market or to affect 
derivative positions, will drastically effect individuals who rely on 
banks for trustworthy and well-founded financial instruments. 
III. BARCLAYS BANK LIB OR MANIPULATION 
This section provides an overview of the LIBOR manipulation 
scandal presented through the recent investigations into Barclays Bank. 
Part A describes Barclays's attempts to manipulate LIBOR. Part B 
describes the violations found by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission ("CFTC") under the Commodities Exchange Act and 
provides a discussion of the settlement between Barclays and CFTC. 
A. Evidence of Manipulation 
In the midst of the 2007 financial crisis, the credit markets began to 
freeze up as banks began to suffer losses on their American subprime 
mortgages.41 As a result, banks were reluctant to lend to one another, 
which led to shortages of the funding system worldwide.42 As described 
earlier, when banks are reluctant to lend to one another, a bank's 
LIBOR submission will be higher and it will look less credit worthy to 
39. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36. 
40. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36. 
41. The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21558281 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) 
[hereinafter Rotten Heart of Finance]. 
42. Id. 
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the market. 
At the time of the financial cns1s, Barclays claimed it was 
submitting "honest rates" and other banks were submitting suppressed 
rates, this caused investors to question the financial health of Barclays. 43 
However, the CFTC responded by instituting its own investigation into 
Barclays and uncovered emails between Barclays' traders and traders in 
other banks asking each other to artificially manipulate LIBOR. 44 Upon 
the release of this information, Barclays admitted to manipulating its 
LIBOR submissions so they were more aligned with the rates of rival 
banks.45 Barclays instructed its LIBOR submitters to submit numbers 
that were high enough to be in the "top four" and thus discarded from 
the calculation, but not so high as to draw attention to the bank. 46 In its 
defense, Barclays claimed that it informed the regulators and the Bank 
of England that banks were submitting lower rates than they could 
actually lend at, and Paul Tucker, the deputy governor of the Bank of 
England, authorized Barclays' suppressed submissions. 47 
As the investigations continued, the CFTC found additional 
evidence of Barclays manipulating LIBOR to not only keep its 
submission in line with other panel banks, but also to benefit its 
derivative positions in swaps and futures that were tied to LIBOR. 48 
From January 2005 through May 2009, at least 173 requests for altered 
LIBOR submissions were made to Barclays' submitters. 49 Depending 
on the trader's derivative position, the requests asked for a higher or 
lower LIBOR submission.50 To put the manipulation in perspective, if 
Barclays traders were able to affect the rate in their favor by only one 
43 . Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id.; see also Joe Nocera, Libor's Dirty Laundry, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07 /07 /opinion/libors-dirty-laundry.html (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
46. Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 41; see also Nocera, supra note 45. 
47. Barclays Reveals Bank of England Libor Phone Call Details, BBC NEWS (July 3, 
2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18695181 (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013) [hereinafter Barclays Phone Call Details]. 
48. Id. 
49. Lindsay Fortado & Silla Brush, Barclays Fined by UK., US. for Falsifying Libor 
Rates, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-27 /barclays-said-to-be-nearing-libor-
settlement-with-fsa-cftc (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Dan Jones, 'Done . . .for You 
Big Boy': The Barclays LIBOR Messages, INVESTMENTWEEK (June 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.investmentweek.co. uk/investment-week/news/2187554/-done-for-boy-barclays-
libor-messages (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
50. See Simone Foxman, How Barclays Made Money on LIBOR Manipulation, Bus. 
INSIDER (July 10, 2012), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/how-barclays-made-
money-on-libor-manipulation-2012-7 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
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basis point, or .01 %, it would likely make the traders more than $2 
million. 51 This amount of money created large incentives for traders to 
manipulate the rate with untruthful and inaccurate submissions. 
Additionally, many of these requests were personal favors between 
traders; replies from LIBOR submitters included phrases such as "for 
you, anything" and "done ... for you big boy."52 In another instance, a 
trader thanked a Barclays LIBOR submitter by saying, "Dude. I owe 
you big time! Come over one day after work and I'm opening a bottle of 
Bollinger [ champagne ]53" 54 
In essence, traders were helping each other make money at the cost 
of ordinary borrowers of loans benchmarked on LIBOR. They asked 
each other for favors, so it seemed personal. In the financial industry, 
traders cut deals with each other all the time, 55 as maintaining 
relationships with other banks is sometimes just as important as making 
money. However, when traders negotiate with financial instruments 
such as LIBOR submissions, an official benchmark and a prime 
indicator for market health, they can drastically affect the lending 
market and investors that rely on honest rates. 
B. Barclays Violations of the Commodities Exchange Act 
After the CFTC completed its investigation, the CFTC sanctioned 
Barclays for three major violations. This section will explain each 
violation and will conclude by discussing the Barclays settlement and 
how it spawned additional investigations into other rival banks for 
manipulating LIBOR. 
C. Sanctions against Barclays 
First, the CFTC alleged that Barclays made false, misleading, or 
knowingly inaccurate reports of LIBOR. Section 9(a)(2) of the 
Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA") makes it unlawful for any person 
"knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission through 
the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless, or 
other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly 
inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions 
that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate 
51. Id. 
52. Fortado & Brush, supra note 49; Jones, supra note 49. 
53. See CHAMPAGNE BOLLINGER, available at http://www.champagne-
bollinger.com/en_UK/welcome (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
54. Fortado & Brush, supra note 49; Jones, supra note 49. 
55. Moore, supra note 3. 
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commerce. "56 Here, the CFTC found that Barclays, through the 
transmission of an electronic spreadsheet to Thompson Reuters, 
knowingly delivered American dollar, Japanese yen, and British pound 
sterling LIBOR submissions through the mail or interstate commerce 
that contained market information concerning costs of borrowing, 
liquidity conditions, and stress in the money markets. 57 Additionally, 
Barclays's submissions were false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate 
because they were not based on costs of borrowing unsecured funds in 
the pertinent markets, but rather were based on impermissible factors 
such as: (1) the management directive to lower Barclays' submitted 
rates to manage market and media perceptions of Barclays; and (2) the 
derivatives positions of swaps traders. 58 
Second, CFTC alleged that Barclays attempted to manipulate 
LIBOR. Under section 9(a)(2) of the CEA, it is unlawful for "any 
person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the 
price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for 
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity."59 
Two elements are required to prove an attempted manipulation: ( 1) an 
intent to affect the market price; and (2) an overt act in furtherance of 
that intent. 60 Here, the CFTC found that Barclays traders specifical1li 
intended to affect the price at which the daily rights would be fixed. 1 
The fixings, accomplished by calling Barclays submitters and asking for 
higher or lower submissions, were done in order to benefit the 
derivative positions or to benefit the derivatives trading positions of 
traders at other banks, with whom they actively coordinated. 62 
Third, the CFTC alleged that the Barclays traders aided and abetted 
traders at other banks to manipulate LIBOR. The CFTC alleged that the 
Barclays swap traders and the traders at the other panel banks discussed 
LIB OR submissions that would benefit each banks' respective 
derivative trading positions. 63 The traders at other panel banks asked 
56. 7 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). 
57. Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, As Amended, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In the 
Matter of: Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc., (CFTC 2012) No. 
12-25, at 26, available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/en 
fbarclaysorder062712.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter CFTC Order]. 
58. Id. 
59. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). 
60. CFTC Order, supra note 57, at 26. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 28. 
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the Barclays swap traders to instruct the Barclays LIBOR submitters to 
submit a certain rate, or submit a rate in a direction higher or lower, that 
would benefit the derivatives' positions of the traders at other panel 
banks.64 
D. Barclays Settlement and the Spawn of Global Investigations into 
other Panel Banks 
Almost immediately after the CFTC published its allegations, 
Barclays paid over $450 million to three regulators in the U.S. and the 
U.K., and its chairman, Marcus Agius, resigned.65 Additionally, 
Barclays Chief Executive Officer, Bob Diamond, and Chief Operating 
Officer, Jerry Del Misser, stepped away from their positions without 
taking 2012 bonuses.66 However, after the CFTC report was published, 
the evidence that Barclays' traders aided and abetted traders at other 
banks to manipulate LIBOR spawned criminal investigations into other 
banks' executives and the individuals that contributed to submitting 
false interest rate data for setting the benchmark. 67 As noted by Gary 
Gensler, the chairman of the CFTC, the Barclays LIBOR settlement 
initiated global investigation into rate-rigging at more than a dozen big 
banks that contributed to setting LIBOR during the period of 
manipulation. 68 
Additionally, the CFTC report initiated private lawsuits and class 
actions against the panel banks that made submissions to set LIBOR. 
Collusion among banks to fix LIBOR, either higher or lower, can have 
an enormous effect on a number of sectors, so there is a vast pool of 
potential victims who can seek compensation. 69 As stated by Steve 
Berman, managing partner for Hagens Berman, "[ w ]hile the settlement 
with the CFTC does punish Barclays and other banks, it does little to 
address the losses of perhaps thousands of investors who were 
64. Id. 
65. Moore, supra note 3; see also Sara Schaefer Munoz & Max Colchester, Top 
Officials at Barclays Resign Over Rate Scandal, WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2012), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000142405270230429970457750397 4000425002.html 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
66. Munoz & Colchester, supra note 65. 
67. Peter J. Henning, What the Barclays Settlement Means for Other Banks, 
DEALBOOK (July 3, 2012), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/whats-
next-after-the-barclays-settlement/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
68. Ben Protess, Libor Case Energies a Wall Street Watchdog, DEALBOOK (Aug. 12, 
2012, 8:57 PM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/libor-case-energizes-
gensler-and-the-c-f-t-c/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
69. Id. 
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financially harmed by the conspiracy."70 Therefore, investigations into 
other panel banks and private lawsuits will continue into the foreseeable 
future. 
IV. EVIDENCE OF MANIPULATION AMONG LIBOR 
SUBMITTING BANKS 
This section discusses the evidence suggesting that panel banks 
colluded to manipulate LIBOR during the 2007 and 2008 financial 
cns1s. As stated earlier, the Barclays settlement initiated an 
overwhelming number of private lawsuits and class actions. Many of 
these actions will rely on the following allegations to build their cases. 
Part A will discuss evidence supporting that panel banks artificially 
suppressed LIBOR. Part B will describe the discrepancy between 
LIBOR and Eurodollar deposit rates. Part C will provide evidence that 
LIBOR quotes "bunched" around the fourth lowest quote. 
A. Evidence Supporting that Panel Banks Artificially Suppressed 
LIBOR 
As previously discussed, LIBOR is a calculation of how much 
interest each bank would have to pay to borrow from another bank or a 
bank's borrowing costs. However, LIBOR is not the only method of 
calculating a bank's borrowing costs. Certain statistics, such as the 
probability of default, calculate the degree of likelihood that the 
borrower of a loan or debt will not be able to make the necessary 
scheduled repayments. 71 These calculations are estimated on a daily 
basis by analyzing each banks equity and bond prices, accounting 
information, and general economic conditions (i.e. interest rates, 
unemployment rates, and inflation rates). 72 These factors are essentially 
the same factors used when determining LIBOR submissions. 
Therefore, one would assume that the two statistics, LIBOR and 
probability of default, which account for the same economic factors and 
measure a bank's lending rate, would have a positive coefficient. 
However, during the financial crisis, these rates were in opposition. As 
70. Press Release, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Hagens Berman Files Class 
Action Against Barclays Bank, Others Over Euribor Rate Fixing (July 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/hagens-berman-files-class-action-against-
barclays-bank-others-over-euribor-rate-fixing-161635455 .html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014 ). 
71. Default Probability, INVESTOPEDIA, (2013), available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/defaultprobability.asp#axzz2B 118WVXm (last visited 
on Oct. 8, 2013). 
72. See generally Jens Hilscher et al., Measuring the Risk: A Modern Approach, 90 
RMA J. 60 (2008). 
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seen from the figures below, which list all panel banks that submitted 
LIBOR rates in 2007 and 2008, the correlation coefficients were 
negative. 
To put these coefficients in perspective, if one variable is 
increasing and the other is also increasing then the correlation is 
"positive."73 However, if the variables diverge in opposite directions, 
then the correlation "negative."74 Finding a negative coefficient 
between a bank's daily LIBOR quotes and the daily probabilities of 
default suggests that as the probability of default increases, the LIBOR 
quotes decreases. However, that would violate fundamental finance 
theory because both LIBOR and probability of default are based on the 
same economic factors. If both rates are based on the same economic 
factors, then both statistics should move in the same direction and 
display a positive coefficient. However, as displayed by the graphs 
below, the probability of default and LIBOR quotes throughout the 
financial crisis display a negative coefficient. This was true for every 
LIBOR submitting bank, except HSBC, in both 2007 and 2008. 
Additionally, the same negative coefficient resurfaces regardless of 
whether the data is spread over a one-month, a three-month, or a 
twelve-month term. This disregards any possibility of coincidence 
between the two statistics. Therefore, this would suggest that banks are 
suppressing LIBOR quotes to avoid revealing the higher rates that 
reflect the true (higher) probabilities of default. 
FIGURE 1 
Graph 1: Correlation Coefficients Between Each Bank's Daily LIBOR Bid and Probability 
of Default (PD), One-Month Term 
(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of Kamakura Risk Information Services.) 
73. A. K. SHARMA, TEXT BOOK OF CORRELA TIO NS AND REGRESSION 5 (2005). 
74. Id. 
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FIGURE 2 
Graph 2: Correlation Coefficients BetweenEach Bank's Daily LIBOR Bid and P1·obability 




(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of Kamakura Risk Information Services.) 
FIGURE 3 
Graph 4: Correlation Coefficients BetweenEach Bank's Daih· LIBOR Bid and Pa·obabilitv 
of Default (PD). Twelve-Month Term 
L I I I I • [ . 
-
(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of Kamakura Risk Information Services.) 
B. Evidence Supporting a Discrepancy Between LIBOR and 
Eurodollar Deposit Rates 
The Eurodollar deposit rates are analogous to LIBOR because they 
15
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reflect the rates at which banks in the London Eurodollar money market 
lend American dollars to one another, just as LIBOR is intended to 
reflect rates at which panel banks in the London interbank market lend 
American dollars to one another. 75 Economic and statistical analysis 
strongly supports the Federal Reserve Eurodollar Deposit rate as an 
accurate benchmark for measuring the validity of LIBOR as reported by 
the panel banks. 76 Furthermore, because LIBOR and Eurodollar 
Deposit Rates measure the lending cost to banks of Eurodollar deposits, 
consider important market and financial fundamentals (i.e. monetary 
policy, market risk, and interest rates), and incorporate risk factors, 
absent manipulation, the spread between the rates should always be zero 
or close to zero.77 However, that was not the case. 
As seen in Figures 4 and 5, from January 5, 2000, to about August 
7, 2007, the spread remained positive and very close to zero. However, 
from August 8, 2007, through May 17, 2010, which is the time period of 
alleged manipulation, the spread became negative and reached levels of 
negative 35 basis points. Additionally, during the two-week period 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the spread reached levels 
as high as 153 basis points. Therefore, this evidence demonstrates that 
the panel banks were suppressing their LIBOR quotes and colluding to 
suppress LIBOR. 
FIGURE 4
Figure 3: BBA LIBOR Federal Reserve Eurodollar Spread in 
75. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1 68, In Re Libor-Based 
Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2012) MDR No. 2262, 
available at http://www.hausfeldllp.com/content_documents/9/Stamped-LIBOR-OTC-
Plaintiffs-FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
76. Id. at 71. 
77. Id. 
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FIGURE 5 
Average Spread between Average Spread between 
September 16, 2008 and August 8, 2007 and 
Bank Name September 30, 2008 May 17,2010 
1.Bank ofTokyo-Mitsb. -120 basis points -25 basis points 
2. Bank of America -144 basispoints -30 basis points 
3. Barclays -87 basis points -25 basis points 
4. Citi -142 basis points -32 basis points 
5. cs -122 basis points -27 basis points 
6. Deutsche Bank -129 basis points -31 basis points 
7. HBOS -110 basis points -29 basis points 
8. HSBC -141 basis points -32 basis points 
9. JP MorganChase -153 basis points -35 basis points 
10. Lloyds -146 basis points -30 basis points 
11. N orinBank -126 basis points -25 basis points 
12. Rabo Bank -143 basis points -32 basis points 
13. Royal Bank of Canada -140 basis points -28 basis points 
14. Royal Bank of Scotland -140 basis points -26 basis points 
15. UBS -141 basispoints -29 basis points 
16. West -138 basis points -35 basis points 
C. L/BOR Quotes "Bunched" Around the Fourth Lowest Quote 
Supports Manipulation 
215 
Because of the way LIBOR is calculated, by discarding the four 
highest and lowest reported rates and averaging the remainder, if a 
number of banks sought to act in concert to depress LIBOR, evidence 
would display a strong concentration around the fourth-lowest rate.78 
During the time period when LIBOR was allegedly suppressed, 
evidence demonstrates that the banks, specifically Citigroup, Bank of 
78. Id. at 55. 
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America, and JP Morgan Chase, submitted rates that displayed 
suspicious "bunching" around the fourth lowest quote. 79 This can be 
seen from Figure 6 below. After compiling all the banks LIBOR 
submissions, quotes tend to "bunch" around the fourth-lowest spread. 
However, when comparing this data against I-year CDS spreads, which 
is also an indicator of a bank's financial health, the CDS spreads do not 
"bunch" around the fourth-lowest rate and are more evenly distributed. 
It is well established that "if banks were truthfully quoting their costs, 
we would expect these distributions to be similar,"80 which is not the 
case here. Following the same reasoning described with LIBOR and 
probabilities of default stated earlier, if two statistics are based on the 
same economic factors, their results should be similar. If not, the results 
would disprove basic economic theory. Therefore, the LIBOR rates 
suspicious "bunching" around the fourth-lowest rate, while CDS 
spreads are evenly distributed, suggest manipulation between 
submitting banks. 
FIGURE 6 
1 Year CDS Spreads 1 Year Libor QuotesZi 
·f •, 5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 -1 -.5 0 5 1 1.5 2 
Differencefrom the Fourth Lowest pread Difference fromthe FourthLowest Quote
V. REFORM OF LIBOR: THE WHEATLEY REVIEW 
Martin Wheatley, a top U.K. regulator for the Financial Service 
79. Id. 
80. Connan Andrew Snider & Thomas Y oule, Does the Libor Reflect Banks' 
Borrowing Costs?, Soc. Sci. Res. NETWORK (Apr. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.econ.umn.edu/-youleOOI/libor_ 4_01_10.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
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Authority ("FSA"), conducted an investigation of possible reforms to 
the LIBOR calculation method in order to prevent another manipulation 
scandal. Part A of this section will begin by presenting Wheatley' s 
findings, and then Part B will introduce his recommendations for 
reform. Finally, Part C will share immediate reactions to Wheatley's 
report. If Wheatley's proposal is adopted, it will be included in the 
financial services reform bill. 81 This bill is before parliament and is 
scheduled to receive royal assent next year. 82 
A. Initial Findings From the Wheatley Report 
Wheatley's preliminary recommendation is to reform the current 
LIBOR system rather than implement a full replacement benchmark 
rate. 83 In order to replace the benchmark entirely, one must prove that: 
(1) LIBOR is beyond repair; (2) LIBOR is subject to a better alternative 
that existed in this moment in time; and, critically, (3) an immediate and 
smooth transition to that alternative could be made. 84 Wheatley 
concluded that none of these conditions were met and found that a 
reform would be a more realistic solution than a full overhaul. 85 Due to 
the overwhelming number of financial instruments benchmarked on the 
current LIBOR system, a move to replace LIBOR would "pose an 
unacceptably high risk of significant financial instability" and cause 
large-scale litigation between parties holding contracts that reference 
LIBOR. 86 Additionally, throughout the current manipulation scandal, 
"there has been no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR by market 
participants. "87 This signals that the market has not lost complete 
confidence in the current benchmark rate and that a wholesale 
replacement of LIBOR would be an overreaction to the current 
situation. 
81. See Brooke Masters, Libor to be Regulated 'Without Delay', FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2012, 4:31 PM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6d20d018-1865-l le2-80e9-
00144feabdc0.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
82. Id. 
83. Martin Wheatley, Managing Director, Pushing the Reset Button on LIBOR, FSA 
(Sept. 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0928-mw.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button]. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Martin Wheatley, The Wheatley Review of Libor: Final Report 7, GOV.UK 
(2012), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/1917 62/whea 
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B. Wheatley 's Recommendations for LIB OR Reform 
After Wheatley decided to maintain the current LIBOR system, he 
proposed three major changes to regain trust in the benchmark rate and 
prevent another large-scale manipulation. 88 
First, Wheatley suggested that the British Bankers' Association 
("BBA") hand over the authority to regulate LIBOR to the FSA. 89 The 
current manipulation scandal, occurring over a lengthy period of time, 
provides evidence that the BBA failed to properly oversee the LIBOR-
setting process and should take no further role in the administration and 
governance of LIBOR. 90 Once authority is transferred, the FSA should 
institute an independent committee headed by the FSA' s approved 
persons.91 The committee's obligation would include: surveillance and 
scrutiny of submissions; publication of a statistical digest of rate 
submissions; and periodic reviews addressing the issue of whether 
LIBOR continues to meet market needs effectively and credibly. 92 
Second, Wheatley suggested that the FSA' s independent 
committee institute a clear, consistent, and effective regulatory regime 
that underpins all activity. 93 This would include the authority to write 
and implement rules in relation to the LIBOR process, supervise the 
conduct of the firms and individuals involved in the process ... and "take 
regulatory action for misconduct."94 The independent committee would 
require increased transparency from banks by mandating LIBOR 
submissions be explicitly supported by transactional data that properly 
identifies the bank's current lending rate. 95 Additionally, if banks 
continue to manipulate LIBOR, the FSA' s independent committee 
would be able to impose public censure or financial penalty. 96 
Third, Wheatley suggested that the government should amend 
current legislation to allow the FSA to "prosecute manipulation or 
attempted manipulation. "97 This would enable the FSA to use criminal 
powers for the worst cases of attempted manipulation. 98 Currently, the 
FSA only has statutory powers to investigate various offenses under the 




92. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 12. 
93. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83. 
94. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 16. 
95 . Id. at 27. 
96. Id. at 12. 
97. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83. 
98. Id. 
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Financial Services Market Act 2000 and insider dealing under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993. 99 Therefore, the FSA is not in a position to 
investigate and prosecute LIBOR manipulation. 100 Although Wheatley 
noted that introducing criminal sanctions for LIBOR submissions might 
create overlap with existing fraud offenses, create financial uncertainty, 
and unintentionally criminalize unrelated activities, the civil sanctions 
may not be sufficient to deter the large financial benefits that might be 
obtained from manipulating LIBOR. 101 
C. Immediate Reaction to the Wheatley Review 
In his review, Wheatley stated, "in relation to the question of 
whether administering LIBOR should become a regulated activity, most 
of the responses addressing this issue were in favor of regulation." 102 
Following the report, banking trade bodies, politicians, lawyers, and 
buy-side representatives confirmed his opinion and were in favor of 
regulation. 1 3 Andrew Tyrie, who is leading the government-mandated 
probe into banking standards in the U.K., stated that "[t]he Wheatley 
Review is a welcome initial step ... it has rightly stripped the BBA of 
responsibility for LIBOR . . . brings LIBOR within the scope of 
regulatory oversight and criminal law . . . and ensure[ s] that LIBOR 
can't be rigged again." 104 Additionally, Simon Lewis, Chief Executive 
of the Global Financial Markets Association, said, "the Wheatley 
Review is timely and outlines clear recommendations for change ... 
[GFMA] believes that all systemically important financial benchmarks 
should be subject to regulatory oversight." Furthermore, the BBA 
released a statement saying, "the BBA has strongly stated the need for 
greater regulatory oversight of LIBOR and tougher sanctions for those 
who try to manipulate it." 105 
99. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 18. 
100. Id. 
101. See id. 
102. Id. at 12. 
103. Wheatley Review: Reactionfrom the City, FIN. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012), available 
at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-09-28/martin-wheatley-libor-report-city-of-
london-reaction (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Reaction From City]. 
104. Id. 
105. Press Release, British Bankers' Association, BBA Statement on Conclusions of 
Wheatley Review into LIBOR (Sept. 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.bbalibor.com/news-releases/bba-statement-on-conclusions-of-wheatley-review-
into-libor (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
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VI. PROBLEMS WITH WHEATLEY'S REGULATION 
SCHEME 
This section discusses why Wheatley' s proposed regulation 
scheme fails to account for the current financial structures among banks. 
Wheatley's proposed scheme is another increased transparency and 
regulation scheme that is instituted only after the damage occurred. 
Evidence will show that Wheatley' s regulation scheme fails to address 
the collusion problem between the banks. Without addressing these 
problems, banks will continue to act in their best interest regardless of 
the sanctions or regulatory systems imposed. 
A. Failure to Address Vague Definitions 
After the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a trend in favor of 
increased financial regulation. 106 However, to this day, four years after 
the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression, many of these 
regulation schemes still have not been implemented. Additionally, in 
the view of many scholars, many of the recent financial regulation 
schemes have been far from successful. 107 The prominent explanation 
for this delay is that in many of these regulations the wording and 
definitions are too vague and, if left alone, would lead to expansive 
regulation. 108 To solve this problem, regulating bodies continue to work 
together to interpret the legislations' intent which has only pushed back 
the date which regulation will take effect. 
Wheatley's proposal runs into many of the same problems. For 
example, Wheatley proposes that "the new regulated activities should 
be defined in such a way as to cover the production of the submissions, 
the calculation of the benchmark, ... systems and controls regarding ... 
106. Letter from KPMG, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY PRACTICE LETTER (2010), 
available at http://kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ ArticlesPublications/regulatory-
practice-letters/Documents/rpl-1013-otc-derivatives.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2013); Mike 
Colodny, Federal Reserve Board: Testimony of J. Nellie Liang, Director of Financial 
Stability Policy and Research, on the Financial Oversight Council, given on April 14, 2011 , 
LAWYERS.COM (June 1, 2011), available at 
http://govemment.lawyers.com/blogs/archives/13638-Federal-Reserve-Board-Testimony-of-
J.-Nellie-Liang,-Director-of-Financial-Stability-Policy-and-Research,-on-the-Financial-
Oversight-Council,-given-on-April-14,-2011.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (providing 
evidence through the Dodd-Frank Act, EMIR, and Volcker Rule that the response of the 
2008 financial crisis was increased financial regulation). 
107. See Mercatus Scholars on the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill, MERCATUS 
CENTER, available at http://mercatus.org/features/mercatus-scholars-comment-dodd-frank-
financial-reform-bill (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
108. Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-Frank Act End 
Too Big to Fail? , 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. Rev. 1, 27 (2012). 
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the processes for identifying and querying suspicious submissions."109 
However, Wheatley fails to give any guidance on how to actually define 
these tasks. He does not include any factors that should be considered 
when producing submissions or calculating the benchmark; rather, he 
states that calculations should be "market led" to adapt to current 
market conditions. 110 
Furthermore, to increase transparency, Wheatley suggests that 
LIBOR submissions should be explicitly and transparently supported by 
transactional data. 111 Unlike his definition requirement discussed 
above, Wheatley gives "LIBOR submissions guidelines" which set out 
the specific transactional data that contributing firms should use to 
determine their assessment of their interbank lending. 112 However, to 
provide flexibility for submitters when transactional data is unavailable, 
Wheatley asks submitters to "use their experience of the inter-bank 
deposit market and its relationships with other markets," and allows 
adjustment based on "interpolation or extrapolation from available 
data." 113 In other words, if the bank is actually carrying out unsecured 
inter-bank deposit transactions then it should use that transactional data 
to support its submissions. If not, which commonly occurs, banks are 
still able to use their judgment based on "experience," "relationships," 
and "research" of market data. 114 In essence, Wheatley trusts traders 
with discretionary power to make honest and accurate submissions 
when trading data is unavailable to support submissions. These are the 
same factors that created the opportunity for manipulation in the first 
place. 
Therefore, Wheatley fails to give specific intentions for definitions 
within the regulation scheme, which will lead to overregulation and 
delay implementation. Further, where Wheatley attempts to provide 
definitions, opportunities for continued manipulation remain blatantly 
109. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 13 (emphasis added). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 27. 
112. Id.at28. 
113. Matt Levine, It's the Beginning of the End for Danish Kroner Libor, 
DEALBREAKER (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://dealbreaker.com/2012/09/its-the-
beginning-of-the-end-for-danish-kroner-
liborl?utmsource=feedburner&utmmedium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+dealbreaker+ 
dealbreaker+%28Dealbreaker°/o29&utm _ content=Google+Reader (last visited Sept. 20, 
2013). 
114. See id.; see also Richard E. Farley, The Future of L/BOR- The Final Reportfrom 
the Wheatley Review, Paul Hastings LLP 1,2 (2012), available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/2260.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 
2013). 
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evident. 
B. Failure to Address Banking Culture 
As stated earlier, evidence suggesting banks were colluding to 
manipulate LIBOR spawned Wheatley's investigation. Collusion is an 
agreement amongst competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on 
interfirm communication or transfers. 115 The suppression of interfirm 
rivalry leads to firms earning monopoly profits. 116 Here, evidence 
suggested that banks, which usually compete within the industry, 
colluded with each other to suppress rivalry and enhance profits. 117 
Wheatley's solution to this problem is to "increase transparency" and 
"impose criminal sanctions." 118 
However, Wheatley overlooks the fact that a culture was created 
amongst banks to collude with each other to maximize profits. Only 
increasing transparency and instituting criminal sanctions fails to 
properly address this problem. One should consider the following. 
First, although other benchmark rates exist that could substitute 
LIBOR, in the wake of the biggest manipulation scandal to date, there 
was no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR. 119 This suggests that 
these colluding banks experience no threat of substitutes to other 
benchmark rates and will still control the vast amount of financial 
instruments within the market through LIBOR. In essence, they have a 
monopoly among investors within the LIBOR market. 
Second, as stated earlier, Wheatley's submission platform leaves 
opportunity for LIBOR submitters to make submissions based on their 
own judgment from "experience," "relationships," and "research" of 
market data. This is the same situation for LIBOR submitters when 
they were completely unregulated before the Wheatley report. 
Therefore, as long as potential profits outweigh the potential sanction or 
fines, Wheatley's suggestions will not change the colluding nature 
around LIBOR because major threats to the benchmark rate are absent 
and opportunities for manipulation are still available. 
Now, what would be the immediate response to such an argument? 
Make sure Wheatley' s sanctions or criminal penalties are high enough 
to deter banks from colluding to manipulate LIBOR. However, if 
115. See ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: 
CARTELLS AND BIDDING RINGS VIII (2012). 
116. Id. at 5. 
117. See Foxman, supra note 50. 
118. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 18. 
119. See id. at 7. 
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opportunities arise, which they will, where LIBOR rates are based on 
trader's "experience," "relationships," and "research" of market data, 
then it will be very difficult for regulatory bodies to impose criminal 
sanctions without a bank admitting its wrongdoing like Barclays. 
However, the current regulatory structure and the profitable business 
relationship between banks makes such a situation very unlikely. 
First, the regulatory structure makes an admission of manipulation 
unlikely. The ability of the bank to maximize personal benefit is based 
on the ability to predict what the other side will do in response to either 
abiding by the regulations or manipulating LIBOR. 120 Given that in 
almost all cases the regulatory body has less funds, personnel, 
resources, and expertise than its bank counterparts, there is little to be 
gained in the long run by cooperating, and much to be gained by 
maximizing its own benefit. 121 Therefore, if the regulatory body does 
not have the means to properly overlook every submission of banks, 
submissions may continue to be manipulated to maximize personal 
gam. 
Second, the relationship between banks makes an admission of 
manipulation unlikely. The banks involved in submitting LIBOR rates 
are amongst the biggest and most respected banks in the world. 122 In 
addition, LIBOR submitting banks participate in a vast amount of 
financial transactions with each other. If one bank was to report 
manipulation of another bank, it may jeopardize a working business 
relationship. Sacrificing a business relationship, especially a profitable 
one, would likely outweigh the choice to come forward to comply with 
Wheatley' s regulation scheme. 
Therefore, Wheatley's proposed criminal sanctions will not affect 
the banking culture and incentives to collude in the long run. 
VII. PROPOSAL FOR LIBOR REFORM 
This section provides insight on a possible solution to 
shortcomings within the LIBOR system and Wheatley's proposal. Part 
A will characterize the present regulator-regulatee system that is 
currently in place and explain why only regulation will not be sufficient. 
Afterwards, Part B will explain a possible solution to alter the 
120. DAVID RUBENS Assoc., THE REGULATORY SYSTEM WHY IS IT FAILING? 1, 7 
(2012), available at http://www.davidrubens-
associates.com/PDFS/DRA_The%20Regulatoty°/o20System%20-
%20Why%20Is%20It%20Failing_Aug2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
121. Id. 
122. Top IO Investment Banks, BANKS AROUND THE WORLD, available at 
http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/top-investment-banks (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
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regulatory structure. 
A. LIBOR Regulation and Modern Day Game Theory 
As explained earlier, Wheatley proposed a regulatory structure that 
would place all LIBOR submitting banks under the governance of the 
FSA. However, the supervisory role of the regulatory bodies, with 
threat of punitive action, only creates a modem day game theory and 
makes collusion among banks the optimal solution. 
Game theory attempts to look at the relationships between 
participants in a particular model and predict their optimal decisions. 123 
The most well-known example is the prisoner's dilemma. 124 For 
example, imagine that two prisoners are offered the opportunity to 
either deny a charge or give evidence against the other one. 125 If both 
Prisoner A and Prisoner B stay silent, they each receive one month 
imprisonment. 126 If they both provide evidence against the other, they 
each receive three months imprisonment. 127 However, if one prisoner 
rats on the other, who in tum stays silent, then the prisoner who gives 
the evidence goes free, and the prisoner who was betrayed receives one 
year imprisonment. 128 
It is well recognized that the optimal strategy in the above situation 
is to give evidence against the other person. 129 Although both sides 
would attain a lower sentence if they stayed silent, the prisoners have no 
control over each other's actions and will give up each other. 130 
However, the optimal strategy changes if the prisoners can adjust their 
strategy based on previous experience. This is a more practical view for 
comparison with the financial regulatory structure. In such a situation, 
commonly identified as 'tit for tat,' the optimal strategy would be to 
repeat what the other party did on the first occasion. If the first choice 
was to cooperate, then continue to cooperate. If the first choice was to 
123. Game Theory, lNVESTOPEDIA, available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gametheory.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
124. See Prisoner's Dilemma, ANNENBERG LEARNER, available at 
http://www.learner.org/courses/mathilluminated/units/9/textbook/04.php (last visited Sept. 
20, 2013); DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note 120, at 6. 




129. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note 
120, at 7. 
130. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note 
120, at 7. 
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betray, then continue to betray. 131 
Here, strong evidence supports the conclusion that LIBOR 
submitting banks have been "cooperating" for an extended period of 
time. As seen in the 'tit for tat' theory, it is mutually beneficial for all 
parties involved to continue to "cooperate." However, unlike the 
prisoners in the example who seek less jail time, "mutually beneficial" 
for LIBOR submitting banks equals extraordinary financial gains. 
Additionally, the incentive to "cooperate" only increases if one includes 
the fact that most regulators are less funded and resource intensive than 
the majority of LIBOR submitting banks. If regulators cannot provide 
funds for proper supervision or banks realize they are more likely to get 
away with manipulation than face punitive damages, then banks will 
only continue to "cooperate." Therefore, a regulatory structure must be 
instituted that creates a situation that makes LIBOR submitting banks 
"betray" each other rather than "cooperate." 
B. Creation of a "Whistle Blowing" Incentive System 
As stated above, if banks are not deterred from cooperating then 
financial regulations will be ineffective. However, a "whistle blowing" 
incentive system incorporated within Wheatley's proposed regulatory 
scheme could tum the LIBOR submitting banks against each other. 
A similar program was instituted within the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act, which rewards 10 to 30 percent of monetary 
sanctions for whistleblowers who report to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") original information leading to securities law 
enforcement actions that recover more than $1 million. 132 As a result, 
the SEC reported that the "whistle blowing" program received 3,001 
formal written whistleblower "tips" seeking consideration for an award 
in 2012 ( excluding tips that reported alleged violations that were 
received from persons who were ineligible to receive a bounty). 133 
Here, if a similar "whistle blower" program was instituted, the 
131. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note 
120, at 7. 
132. Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-Frank Act's Robust Whist/eh/owing Incentives, 
FORBES (Apr. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011 /04/14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robust-
whistleblowing-incentives/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
133. Scott J. Wenner, United States: SEC Report Confirms Substantial Dodd-Frank 
Whistle-Blowing Activity, lllustrating Need for Employers To Be Proactive - And Careful, 
MONDAQ (Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/208852/Whistleblowing/SEC+Report+Confirms+Su 
bstantial+DoddFrank+WhistleBlowing+Activity+Illustrating+Need+For+Employers+To+B 
e+Proactive+And+Careful (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
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dynamic between the regulator and a LIBOR submitting bank would be 
altered. Banks would no longer be subjected to possible punitive 
damages from the regulators, but they also could be subjected to 
"whistle blowing" claims made by other banks or players in the 
industry. Additionally, if "whistle blowing" incentives are comparable 
to the gains made by manipulating LIBOR, banks would be more likely 
to "blow the whistle." LIBOR submitting banks would be able to make 
similar short term profits by tipping regulators of misconduct, but would 
do so without apprehension of their own misconduct. Such a program 
would incentivize LIBOR submitting banks to betray each other and 
"blow the whistle" rather than "cooperate." 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The LIBOR manipulation scandal is considered one of the biggest 
scandals the financial world has seen to date. While in 1960, when 
LIBOR was instituted, an unregulated system to set the world's largest 
benchmark for lending may have been acceptable, it is clear that 
structural changes are needed. The evidence presented in this Note 
points not only to a couple greedy individuals looking to make a quick 
buck ( or million), but an industry wide manipulation, that included 
some of the most powerful corporations within the financial industry. 
Additionally, as this Note has illustrated, the manipulation did not just 
affect the financial markets, but had devastating effects to almost every 
person that went to the bank and took out a loan. 
Wheatley's proposal is a much-needed step. LIBOR needs to be 
heavily regulated to prevent a scandal like this from ever happening 
again. However, Wheatley' s proposal does not fix the problem and 
contains multiple shortcomings. First, a banking culture was created 
amongst banks to collude with each other to maximize profits. If this 
culture is not altered, banks will just look to other ways to make money 
to compensate for any sanction a regulatory body will impose. 
Additionally, most, if not all, of these banks engage in a vast amount of 
financial transactions together and reporting partner banks' attempted 
manipulation may jeopardize these relationships. Second, Wheatley 
leaves room for submitters to use their own "experience" and 
"relationships" to set LIBOR. In effect, Wheatley gives LIBOR 
submitters large discretion for setting the rate, which is exactly what 
created the opportunity for manipulation. 
To solve these problems, this Note has discussed an incentive 
program to change the structure between financial regulators and the 
LIBOR submitting banks. If a system is implemented that makes it 
more or equally profitable to "blow the whistle" than collude, future 
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manipulation will be prevented. 
29
Weldon: The LIBOR Manipulation Scandal & The Wheatley Review: A Band-Aid
Published by SURFACE, 2013
